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Abstract
We study the vulnerability of dominating sets against random and targeted node removals
in complex networks. While small, cost-efficient dominating sets play a significant role in
controllability and observability of these networks, a fixed and intact network structure
is always implicitly assumed. We find that cost-efficiency of dominating sets optimized
for small size alone comes at a price of being vulnerable to damage; domination in the
remaining network can be severely disrupted, even if a small fraction of dominator nodes
are lost. We develop two new methods for finding flexible dominating sets, allowing either
adjustable overall resilience, or dominating set size, while maximizing the dominated frac-
tion of the remaining network after the attack. We analyze the efficiency of each method
on synthetic scale-free networks, as well as real complex networks.
Introduction
Dominating sets play a critical role in complex networked systems by providing efficient
sources of influence and information dispersal, or hubs of surveillance [1, 2, 3, 4], and are
applied in social, infrastructure, and communication networks [5, 6, 7]. Most recently,
∗E-mail: molnaf@rpi.edu
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dominating sets were employed to controllability in complex networks [8, 9, 10, 11], ob-
servability of the power-grid [12], and to finding high-impact optimal subsets in protein
interaction networks [13]. While finding the smallest, most efficient dominating set has
gained significant interest, it is also important to understand how robust these dominating
sets are against various forms of network damage.
By definition, a dominating set is a subset of nodes in a network, such that every node
not in the dominating set is adjacent to at least one node in this set; in other words, every
node has at least one neighbor (or itself) in the dominating set. The smallest cardinality
dominating set is the minimum dominating set (MDS), which is of particular interest,
because it provides the most cost-efficient solution for network control, assuming a constant
per-node cost of implementing control, in fixed or slowly evolving networks. Research has
been focused on finding bounds for the size of MDS [1, 14], finding approximations to the
MDS [15, 16], understanding its expected scaling behavior in complex networks [3, 4], and
studying the impact of assortativity on network domination [2, 17].
Attacks on complex networks, fault tolerance, and defense strategies against damage
of nodes and edges have also gained significant interest in network science [18, 19, 20, 21].
Networks with scale-free topologies have been found to be resilient against random node
damage, but vulnerable to targeted removal of high degree nodes [22, 23, 24]. Research has
also focused on improving the robustness of these networks against various combinations
of attacks [25, 26, 27], and on studying the dynamically progressing effects of an initial
damage, such as cascading failures [28, 29].
The connectivity of the surviving network structures and the fraction of the remaining
set of nodes still dominated following failures or attacks are both essential for sustainable
network operations and carrying out network functions. While the former (structural
integrity) has been studied in great detail over the past two decades [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24], the latter (domination stability) has not received any attention.
We assume that the network damage is relatively small, and although the network may
become fragmented due to the loss of nodes, we assume it remains functional. In such
cases efficient domination over the network is still important and desirable, just as it is
in undamaged networks. However, considering that most dominating set search methods
aim for the smallest possible set size (and corresponding cost) in a fixed topology network,
even a small damage could severely disrupt the complete domination “coverage”. Our goal
is to understand how fragile dominating sets are, how to improve them, and ultimately
to provide new methods for selecting dominating sets with adjustable balance between
resilience and cost.
In order to quantify the resilience of a dominating set against network damage, we
define domination stability as the fraction of the remaining network still dominated after
some nodes have been removed from the network (and thus from the dominating set):
s(f) :=
|⋃j∈DS N+(j)|
N(1− f) , (1)
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where DS is a dominating set of the original (undamaged) network, f is the fraction of
nodes removed from the network, and N+(j) is the closed neighborhood of node j that still
exists in the remaining network. In order to measure stability, we need to simulate net-
work damage by actually removing nodes from the network and calculating the remaining
dominated fraction.
Domination stability depends not only on the fraction of removed nodes, but also on
the order in which nodes have been removed from the network. Similarly to many studies
in the literature, we consider two damage scenarios: random and targeted node removals.
The random node removal strategy models network damage produced by natural causes or
errors, while the targeted node removal method reflects the impact of intentional, targeted
attacks on a network. In the random damage scenario nodes are removed with equal
probability, in random order. In case of targeted attacks, the nodes are removed in degree-
ranked order, with highest degrees being removed first. We indicate which strategy we
consider in the subscript of stability: srand denotes the stability against random damage,
and sdeg corresponds to the stability against degree-ranked removal.
Results
Stability of Various Fixed Dominating Sets
We start our analysis by measuring the stability of three different dominating sets, that
we use for baseline comparison with our new methods. These are the following:
• greedy minimum dominating set (MDS) [1, 4, 30], where nodes are selected by a
sequential greedy search algorithm in order to approximate the actual (NP-hard)
smallest dominating set,
• “cutoff” dominating set (CDS) [17], where all nodes above a degree threshold are
selected into set X, and the nodes not dominated by any nodes in set X are selected
into set Y . The dominating set is then given by X ∪ Y . The degree threshold is
selected such that it minimizes the size of the resulting dominating set,
• degree-ranked dominating set (DDS), where we select all nodes in decreasing order
of degree (with random tie-breaking) as dominators until the selected set dominates
the entire network.
Our first choice is MDS, due to its importance in cost-efficient control of complex networks,
and because it provides a high-quality approximation to the actual smallest dominating
set. The other methods we have chosen are potentially useful when finding the greedy
MDS or solving the binary integer programming equivalent is impractical, e.g., when the
adjacency information of the network is incomplete, or the network is too large to run these
algorithms in a reasonable amount of time. In these cases heuristic algorithms, such as
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CDS or DDS can find suboptimal (not the smallest possible), yet small enough dominating
sets that are still useful for practical applications. In particular, the excess nodes selected
by these methods may help to increase domination stability.
Figure 1 shows the stability against the fraction of removed nodes for MDS, CDS and
DDS in the entire remaining network [Fig. 1(a), (b)] and in the remaining giant component
[Fig. 1(c), (d)]. It is clear that the degree-ranked node removal reduces the dominated
fraction much faster than the random node removal, because high-degree nodes are more
likely to be dominator nodes than low degree nodes. The giant component itself also
breaks down much faster, as shown in the insets of Fig. 1(c) and (d). However, as long
as a giant component exists, it has higher domination stability than the entire network, in
both scenarios. The slight increase of stability at high damage rates is a side effect caused
by removal of nodes that had lost domination by earlier removals. When the network
damage is high, it becomes more likely that these nodes are deleted, causing the dominated
fraction of the remaining network to increase. At this point, however, the network is almost
completely destroyed and domination stability becomes meaningless.
The stability curves show much more disturbed shapes in degree-ranked removal than
random removal, due to the differences in the degree structure of each dominating set.
In MDS, there is no preference toward any particular node degree during selection of
dominators (besides the natural effect of the greedy selection, where the high-degree nodes
provide a larger increase in the number of dominated nodes, hence they are more likely to
be selected), which means that removal of high-degree nodes has a smooth (albeit strong)
impact on stability. In CDS, we can see a fast initial drop as we remove the very high
degree nodes that were specifically selected for dominators (in set X), then continuing at
a more gentle slope as the dominators from the Y set are removed, since any node that
was not dominated by X, regardless of degree, may be in set Y . On one hand the Y set
may seem wasteful in its construction, but with the right degree threshold the size of the
CDS is actually very close to the MDS [17], and the excess nodes provide a fair increase
in stability. DDS is the simplest but most inefficient method for finding a dominating set
because it selects all nodes starting from the highest degrees until all nodes are dominated.
However, the resulting redundancy of dominators in the network is providing the highest
stability of all three methods.
We can also observe the general tendency that a larger dominating set provides higher
stability. At any given fraction of removed nodes, there is a positive correlation between
stability and the size of the original dominating set, in both random [Fig. 1(a)] and degree-
ranked [Fig. 1(b)] node removals. We clearly illustrate this correlation in Fig. 1(e) and (f),
where we show stability as a function of the dominating set size, at various damage levels.
This means that the MDS, which is the smallest (most cost-efficient) dominating set, is
also the most vulnerable, to both random damage and targeted attacks.
Note, that Fig. 1 only shows the stability for a certain network type with given degree
exponent and uncorrelated networks (where Spearman’s ρ = 0). Stabilities at different
values of these parameters are presented in Supplementary Figures S1–S5.
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We have also included supplementary videos to illustrate the evolution of domination
stability as the network disintegrates, during random node removal (Supplementary Movie
1) and degree-ranked node removal (Supplementary Movie 2).
The main conclusion we can draw is that the extra amount of dominating nodes selected
by heuristic methods CDS and DDS, compared to the smaller and more optimal MDS, can
effectively increase the stability of domination. However, all three methods are “fixed”
in the sense that they give only a single possible dominating set size (and corresponding
stability) for a given network.
Flexible-Redundancy Dominating Set (frDS)
In order to overcome the limitations of fixed methods, we must analyze in detail how
domination is lost when the network is damaged. First, we realize that loss of domination
occurs locally at each node: those nodes that lose all dominators will reduce the domination
stability of the network. Therefore, stability can be expressed locally, as the domination
redundancy of each node. This quantity simply counts how many dominating nodes are
within the closed neighborhood of a given node. A large dominating set can successfully
increase domination stability, if the extra nodes are distributed in a way that they increase
domination redundancy on many nodes. This seems to occur naturally for CDS and DDS,
however we cannot guarantee that redundancy was increased in the most optimal way
(relative to MDS), nor can we control the number of selected nodes.
We introduce the flexible-redundancy dominating set (frDS) to solve these problems.
We explicitly set an average domination redundancy in the network, denoted by r, that
must be guaranteed by frDS, while aiming for minimum set size. Note, that r = 1 is
equivalent to the minimum dominating set (MDS), and when r is an integer, the frDS is
identical to the h-dominating set (with h = r) studied by Cooper, et al. [40]. Finding an
frDS is most likely NP-hard, since it is also NP-hard to find an MDS [41] or an h-dominating
set [42], but we can use a modified greedy algorithm to find an approximation.
The steps of finding an frDS are as follows. First, we assign a domination redundancy
requirement, r(i) for each node i as an integer value indicating at least how many dom-
inators node i must have in the dominating set. Given the desired average (non-integer)
r value for the entire network, we assign the nearest integer values brc and dre to each
node randomly, such that the network average will be r (the probability of assigning dre
is r − brc, which is analogous to a biased coin toss). For the greedy selection we define
a dominating potential p(i) as the number of nodes in the closed neighborhood of i that
have not yet reached their domination requirement, and therefore selecting node i can help
them advance toward their goal. (Note, by definition, the potential of an already selected
node is zero.) At each greedy step we select one node with maximum dominating poten-
tial (with random tie-breaking), until the requirements of all nodes have been fulfilled.
Note, that since dominating potential is an integer number between 0 and N , nodes can
be sorted according to their potential in O(N) steps, and it is possible to maintain sort-
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edness after changing the potential of a node in O(1) step (see Supplementary Note 1 for
further details and pseudocode). This results in the same computational time complexity
as for the greedy MDS approximation, O(E). Also note, that if r > N , then the node
requirements can never be satisfied, in which case the greedy selection naturally falls back
to selecting nodes in degree-ranked order, because at every step every neighbor of a node
may be advanced toward its goal.
Flexible-Cost Dominating Set (fcDS)
When we aim for a desired dominating set size (cost level, i.e., having a limited budget),
we can, in principle, aim for the necessary redundancy level in frDS to achieve that desired
cost. However, we can further improve stability by considering the expected attack pattern
on the network (if the information is available), and optimize the selected dominating set
accordingly. For example, if the attack is expected at high-degree nodes, we should avoid
selecting many of those nodes as dominators, despite their ability to cover large fractions
of the network.
We can optimize our choice of dominators by including the probability of losing each
node into the calculation of local stability, which we aim to maximize. First, we assign
a strength value s(i) ∈ (0, 1) to each node i, which represents the a-priori estimated
probability for not losing that node after the attack (i.e., the anticipated attack pattern).
Then, we calculate the current domination stability of node i as follows:
stability(DS, i) =
{
0 if DS ∩N+(i) = ∅
1−∏j∈DS∩N+(i)(1− s(j)) otherwise, (2)
which is the probability that node i will remain dominated (not lose all dominators), as-
suming nodes will be deleted independently; DS denotes the currently selected dominating
set. For selecting the next dominator, we choose one that increases the total stability of
the network maximally. The total potential increase of stability can be calculated for each
node as follows:
potential(i) =
∑
j∈N+(i)
stability(DS ∪ {i}, j)− stability(DS, j) (3)
=
∑
j∈N+(i)
(1− stability(DS, i)) · s(i). (4)
Therefore, we always select a node with maximum potential (with random tie-breaking).
Note, that unlike in frDS, the potential here is a non-integer value, thus we can only use
comparative sorting to order nodes by potential, which needs O(N logN) steps. In ad-
dition, after selecting each dominator, the stability values have to be recomputed in the
selected node’s closed neighborhood, and the potentials up to the node’s second neigh-
borhood. This involves O(d2) nodes, where d is the average degree. Thus, maintaining
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sortedness of nodes by their potential requires O(d2 logN) steps after selecting each dom-
inator.
In order to compare stability of fcDS with frDS and other dominating sets, we calculate
the “a-priori” node strength values as follows: s(i) = 0.5 for random node removal, and
s(i) = 1− d(i)/N for degree-ranked node removal. Here, we assume the size of the antici-
pated damage is unknown, thus strength values are expressing relative probabilities only.
The strength value for a random damage is arbitrary, as long as it is uniform among the
nodes, and it is inversely proportional to node degree in a degree-ranked attack. Further
details of fcDS and pseudocode are included in Supplementary Note 2.
Stability Comparison of Dominating Sets
We seek to answer two main questions in our analysis. First, we want to see how much
stability we can achieve by selecting various sizes of dominating sets (in other words, how
does the stability scale with larger invested cost of domination). Second, we want to know
how much more efficient our methods are compared to the fixed dominating sets, that is,
given the same size of dominating set as MDS, CDS, or DDS, how much higher stability
can our methods provide.
Figures 2 and 3 show domination stability achieved by frDS and fcDS as a function of
redundancy and dominating set size, respectively. Stability achieved by the fixed methods
(MDS, CDS, DDS) are also shown at their corresponding cost values for comparison. The
general shape of the curves in both figures are similar, since the dominating set size is
roughly proportional to redundancy (see Fig. 2 inset and Supplementary Fig. S6). In
case of random damage, the stability rapidly increases with cost, until the size of MDS is
reached, then the curve saturates. There is little advantage in selecting a dominating set
larger than approximately twice the size of MDS, because stability is already very close
to 1, even at large damage values. However, in case of degree-ranked damage, there is a
steady increase in stability as more nodes are selected as dominators. In both cases, fcDS
provides somewhat higher stability than frDS at moderate damage levels, but frDS is more
stable at small damage levels. These observations hold across a wide range of network
parameters, see Supplementary Figs. S7 and S8. It is also clear that both frDS and fcDS
can provide great flexibility in adjusting the size of the dominating set and stability.
The stability of frDS and fcDS at cost levels identical to MDS, CDS, and DDS are
presented in Fig. 4. Our results show that frDS provides stability values very similar to
the fixed methods (in case of MDS, it is identical by definition, thus it is not shown), while
fcDS shows a minor improvement in stability. On the other hand, both frDS and fcDS
show significant improvement over the fixed methods against degree-ranked attacks, at low
network damage fractions. MDS and CDS show a tipping point in damage, where these
methods become slightly more effective than frDS or fcDS, but the difference is minimal,
and it occurs only at moderate to high network damage (f & 0.3).
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Stability in Real Networks
We analyze stability of frDS and fcDS, as well as other dominating sets, in several real
complex networks, listed in Table 1. These include an internet peer-to-peer network (p2p-
Gnutella08) [43], the power transmission network of continental Europe (ENTSO-E power-
grid) [44, 45], and one brain graph extracted from MRI data (KKI21-KKI2009-19) [46, 47].
Note, that we only use the giant component of these networks. A brief analysis of the
degree distribution of Gnutella08 is provided in Supplementary Figs. S15–S17; degree
distribution of the powergrid is provided in Supplementary Figs. S18–S21.
The brain graph we analyze here (KKI-21-KKI2009-19) is one of 200 graphs available
from [46]. These graphs have peculiar structural properties, and are very similar to each
other. In particular, all brain graphs are very dense: 〈k〉 ≈ 150 (Supplementary Fig. S21);
they are all very assortative: ρ ≈ 0.6 (Supplementary Fig. S22); and they have very similar
degree distributions (see Supplementary Figs. S23–S25). It is also interesting that the size
of MDS is very small, only 3-4% network size, while the size of CDS and DDS is very
large, around 60% and 100% of network size, respectively (Supplementary Fig. S26). We
attempt to separate the effects of density and assortativity in order to identify their impact
on domination stability.
Figure 5 shows domination stability as a function of dominating set size for the real
network samples. In general, we see that stability of frDS and fcDS matches the stability
of MDS, and exceeds the stability of CDS and DDS, at identical set sizes. In case of
Gnutella08 and the powergrid, the stability curves saturate slowly, and the curve shapes
are not as smooth as for synthetic scale-free networks, due to having more disturbed (non-
scale-free) degree distributions. However, the brain graph shows very high domination
stability against both random and targeted attacks. In all cases, the relative advantage
of frDS and fcDS over CDS and DDS (i.e., cost-efficiency) remains as high as in synthetic
scale-free networks.
We can observe the effects of assortativity separately from other structural properties
by artificially changing the network’s assortativity, using a biased edge-mixing method (see
in [17] and Supplementary Note 3), which rewires the edges in the graph, while keeping the
degree sequence unchanged. Using this method we present a brief analysis of dominating
set size vs. assortativity in Supplementary Figs. S27–S29. In general, we see the expected
behavior that dominating sets tend to become larger in more assortative networks [17].
Note, that the size of DDS in the brain graph (Supplementary Fig. S29) being 100% of
nodes regardless of assortativity is the result of a particular topological feature; there are
a small number of leaves (degree 1 nodes) connected to degree 2 nodes, thus DDS has to
select al nodes down to degree 2 (essentially all nodes) to dominate these off-hanging leaves
— a feature left unchanged by edge-mixing.
Figure 6 presents the effects of assortativity on domination stability. We see an unex-
pected behavior: as assortativity increases, domination stability decreases against random
damage, but increases against an attack on high-degree nodes. We can understand this
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behavior by considering the effects of assortativity on dominator node degrees. In disas-
sortative networks dominators are mostly high-degree hubs, while in assortative networks
dominators have a full range of degrees. Thus, when the network is disassortative and the
damage is random, it is less likely to remove high-degree hubs and more likely to remove
low degree nodes, the latter rarely being a dominator, leading to increased stability. On
the other hand, the result is reversed when high-degree nodes are targeted, in which case
we are more likely removing dominators, leading to decreased stability.
Finally, we can conjecture that the outstandingly high domination stability in brain
graphs can be attributed to both their high average degree and high assortativity. High
average degree results in a highly redundant dominating set (regardless of method) which
resists random damage successfully, while high assortativity guarantees that an attack
targeted at high degrees leaves the network with plenty of lower-degree dominators.
Partial Flexible-Redundancy Dominating Sets
There are two possible ways to achieve a certain desired cost (dominating set size) with
frDS. Either we aim for the lowest r value that provides the desired cost, or we may choose
a larger r value, and use only a fraction of the larger dominating set it provides. In the
latter case we would select nodes in the same order as the greedy algorithm picked them.
In other words, we can either select a full frDS with small r or a partial frDS with the same
size but larger r. Figure 7 shows the comparison of these two cases (see Supplementary
Figures S9–S14 for analysis over a wide range of network parameters). The contour curves
of fixed stability values are monotonically increasing for larger r values, indicating that
the cost for a certain stability level increases if we use partial frDS with higher r values.
This also means that using full frDS with the smallest possible r value provides the highest
possible stability.
In order to find the needed r value for a desired cost we must look at the relationship be-
tween r and the size of the resulting dominating set (see Fig. 2(a) inset, and Supplementary
Figure S6). The frDS size curve has a complex shape, but it is always monotonically in-
creasing. Therefore, we can use a bisection method for finding the desired r value. Without
any assumptions (other than monotonicity) about the size of frDS we must calculate the
full frDS for every tested r, each taking O(E) time, leading to O(E logN) time complexity
for the entire procedure.
It is also interesting to note that the cost of stability increases slightly for smaller r
values when r < 1, in case of a random damage [in Fig. 7(a)]. In this case even the full
frDS is providing only a partial dominating set (dominating only a fraction of nodes in the
undamaged network). This indicates that r should never be smaller than 1; if a smaller
cost is needed than the one provided by frDS with r = 1 (which is the MDS by definition),
then a partial MDS (given by the greedy MDS algorithm) is a more optimal solution.
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Effects of Incorrectly Estimated Damage in fcDS
For practical applications of fcDS, it is necessary to understand how stability is affected,
when the network damage is estimated incorrectly. We can check this effect for a degree-
ranked attack by using the following sigmoid strength function for a node with degree
k:
s(k) =
1
1 + eα(k−κ(α,f))
. (5)
There are two control parameters for the anticipation. The slope parameter α ∈ (−∞,∞)
describes the attack distribution: it expresses whether low degrees (α < 0) or high degrees
(α > 0) are targeted, and how sharp the difference is between targeted and non-targeted
node strengths; parameter f is the anticipated damage fraction. The κ(α, f) function
gives the threshold for the sigmoid, such that the expected number of lost nodes equals the
anticipated damage,
∑
k(1 − s(k))p(k) = f (where p(k) is the degree distribution). Note,
that α = ∞ gives a sharp cutoff selecting all nodes above κ, corresponding to the actual
attack; 0 < α . 5 corresponds to an uncertain transition point but correct anticipation;
a ≈ 0 corresponds to a random guess; −5 . α < 0 corresponds to an incorrect anticipation
(i.e., anticipating attack on low degree nodes, when the attack occurs at high-degree nodes);
and α −5 is the complete opposite of the actual attack.
Figure 8 shows the landscape of stability as a function of the control parameters. As
expected, we obtain the highest stability when the attacked degrees and the size of the
attack are correctly estimated. For small damage fractions (f = 0.1) we lose stability
mostly for overestimating the size of the attack, while for moderate (f = 0.3) and large
(f = 0.5) damages we lose stability for incorrectly anticipating which degrees are targeted.
Discussion
We must clarify and make a distinction between the prescribed domination redundancy and
the actual achieved domination redundancy in a network, when using frDS. The former is
the one denoted by the r parameter, while the latter (i.e., the actual number of dominators
in the closed neighborhood of a node) can be easily calculated for any given dominating set
(not just frDS), and its average always exceeds the prescribed value. For example, even an
MDS could have an actual average redundancy of 2.5 in certain networks, although most
nodes would have only one dominator. However, an frDS with r = 2.5 would guarantee
not only that the actual redundancy is at least 2.5, but also that no nodes will have less
than 2 dominators.
The usage of frDS against degree-ranked or any other targeted attacks seems counter-
intuitive, since in frDS, we aim for an overall increased redundancy that is most effective
against random damage. However, the greedy algorithm has no preference toward selecting
low-degree or high-degree dominators when trying to fulfill domination requirements, and
in general, we observe empirically that the selected dominators have a large variability in
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degrees. This indicates that dominators of a given node may have significantly different
degrees, which helps to keep the node dominated even if high degree nodes are targeted by
an attack.
In the calculation of node stability in fcDS we assumed that nodes are deleted indepen-
dently. In a realistic scenario, an attack may have between-node correlations, especially,
in spatial graphs (e.g., clustered attack on a power grid). Taking this into count would
add more complexity to the calculations, which we postpone for future work. However,
it is important to emphasize that even without correlations, the fcDS algorithm can use
arbitrary node strength values, irrespective of node degrees, therefore its applicability goes
much beyond our studied scenario of a degree-ranked attack.
Currently, the time complexity of fcDS is O(d2 logN) for selecting each dominator node,
which makes it prohibitive for very large graphs. In order to speed up the algorithm, the
only obstacle we need to overcome is maintaining the sortedness of nodes by their potentials
efficiently, which takes O(logN) steps after each change with comparative sorting. In
principle, the potentials could be discretized and assigned to bins (the same optimization
we use in frDS), which would lead to O(E) complexity, as long as the bin count remains
O(N). However, the effects of such discretization on the dominating set and its stability
is unclear, and it would require a thorough analysis to test the method’s viability.
We can easily explain that fcDS has a slightly lower stability than frDS at low damage
fractions, which we can observe in all graphs, by looking at the effects of incorrect attack
anticipation. When the actual damage is very small, we overestimate the damage with
our degree-dependent strength formula (s(i) = 1 − d(i)/N), because we assign nonzero
probabilities to losing nodes with medium to low degrees. In reality, these nodes will
not be deleted in a small targeted attack, thus the overestimated damage causes fcDS to
lose stability, dropping slightly below the levels of frDS. This also underlines the need to
correctly estimate the size as well as the distribution of the expected attack to achieve the
most optimal domination stability.
Finally, we can provide a simple guide for selecting one of our two methods for practical
applications. If we have no detailed information about a potential attack, or the network
is very large, then frDS is a good choice for providing a dominating set with decent stabil-
ity against any form of damage (mostly against random damage originating from natural
sources), with a short computational time. However, if there is a fixed budget for domina-
tors, or detailed (and reliable) information is available about potential attacks, then fcDS
can be used to optimize the selected dominating set for the highest possible stability.
Methods
We measure domination stability as an averaged value over an ensemble of networks, using
the following procedure. First, a network sample is generated, and its dominating set is
calculated by one of the preselected dominating set search algorithms. Then, m nodes are
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removed from the network, according to a predetermined node removal strategy, where
m/N = f is the desired fraction removed from a network with N nodes. Finally, stability
is evaluated using Eq. 1 in the remaining network.
Each node removal strategy is implemented using a sorted list of all nodes in the
network; nodes are sorted such that the first m nodes will be removed. For random node
removal the list of nodes is shuffled (a random permutation is computed) by the Fisher-
Yates algorithm [31]. For degree-ranked node removal the nodes are sorted in decreasing
order of degrees (with random tie-breaking).
We generate scale-free network samples using the configuration model [32, 33]. First,
a discrete power-law degree distribution is constructed for given network size N , degree
exponent γ, and average degree 〈k〉. The degree sequence is then sampled from the degree
distribution, and treated as a set of half-links for each node to be connected. Links are
realized by randomly (uniformly) selecting any two unconnected half-links, until no more
links can be formed. This may result in multiple links between some nodes, but they are
treated only as single links, resulting in a small loss of total links. However, the loss is
negligible, since we only focus on networks with γ > 2.
The average degree is controlled by adjusting the minimum degree cutoff kmin of the
degree distribution, while the maximum degree cutoff kmax =
√
N . The correct kmin value
that yields the desired average degree for the network is obtained from a precomputed
lookup table. We have used the same technique in our previous work [4] where we have
shown the high level of accuracy achievable with this method. According to our previous
notation in [4], the networks we use here are cCONF networks (abbreviation for configu-
ration model with structural cutoff kmax =
√
N).
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Figure 1: Stability of various dominating sets against random and degree-ranked node
removal. Subfigures (a), (c), and (e) show random node removal, (b), (d), and (f) show
degree ranked node removal. Subfigures (a) and (b) show stability in the entire network,
while (c) and (d) show stability within the remaining giant component. The inset in (a)
shows the corresponding sizes of dominating sets, and insets in (c) and (d) show the size
of the corresponding giant component. Subfigures (e) and (f) show a correlation between
set size and stability, at γ = 2.5. All plots show synthetic scale-free networks, N = 5000,
〈k〉 = 8, averaged over 200 network samples.
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Figure 2: Domination stability in frDS and fcDS as a function of domination redundancy.
(a) shows random node removal, (b) shows degree-ranked node removal. The inset shows
the sizes of the corresponding dominating sets. The size of fcDS is set to match frDS at
any given r value. Synthetic scale-free networks, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5, f = 0.3,
averaged over 200 network samples.
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Figure 3: Stability of frDS and fcDS as a function of dominating set size (cost) for various
network damage fractions. Stabilities of MDS, CDS, and DDS are presented at their
corresponding cost values. Subfigure (a) shows random node removal, (b) shows degree-
ranked node removal, for synthetic scale-free networks, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5,
averaged over 200 network samples.
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Figure 4: Comparison of domination stability at fixed cost levels, as a function of network
damage fraction. Stability of frDS and fcDS are plotted at cost values identical to MDS,
CDS and DDS. Subfigure (a) shows random node removal, (b) shows degree-ranked node
removal, for synthetic scale-free networks, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5, averaged over 200
network samples.
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Figure 5: Stability of frDS, fcDS and other dominating sets in real networks against ran-
dom and degree-ranked attacks, for various damage fractions: (a,b) Gnutella peer-to-peer
network; (c,d) ENTSO-E powergrid; (e,f) Brain (MRI) network. Data is averaged over 20
independent runs of node removal. See Table 1 for network parameters.
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Figure 6: Stability of frDS and fcDS in edge-mixed real networks against random and
degree-ranked attacks, for various assortativity levels: (a,b) Gnutella peer-to-peer network;
(c,d) ENTSO-E powergrid; (e,f) Brain (MRI) network. Network damage fraction f = 0.3.
For (a-d) data is averaged over 50 independent runs edge mixing and node removal; (e,f)
is from a single run. See Table 1 for parameters of the original networks.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Domination stability of partial frDS as a function of domination redundancy
and dominating set size. The plotted area is bounded by the size of the full frDS at any
given r. Subfigure (a) shows random node removal, (b) shows degree-ranked node removal,
for synthetic scale-free networks, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5, f = 0.3, averaged over 50
network samples.
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a) synthetic
b) Gnutella08
c) powergrid
Figure 8: Stability of fcDS against degree-ranked node removal as a function of the damage
anticipation accuracy: (a) synthetic scale-free network with N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5;
(b) Gnutella peer-to-peer network; (c) ENTSO-E powergrid. The actual damage fraction
is indicated above the plots and marked by red dashed lines; the actual degree distribution
of the damage corresponds to α ≥ 4 values.
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Name Source N kmin kmax 〈k〉 Spearman’s ρ
Gnutella08 [43] 6299 1 97 6.60 0.03
powergrid [44, 45] 1494 1 13 2.89 −0.18
KKI-21-KKI2009-19 [46, 47] 712098 1 6505 138.2 0.62
Table 1: Parameters of real networks used in our analysis. The data refers exclusively to
the giant component.
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Supplementary Note 1
Algorithm for Finding a Flexible-Redundancy Dominating Set (frDS)
The algorithm for finding a flexible-redundancy dominating set (frDS) is based on greedy
search. At each step we add one node to the dominating set, that helps the maximum
number of nodes to advance toward their required domination goals. There are several
variables that we must define and track for each node.
First, we define the domination requirement r(i) as the number of required dominators
for node i among its closed neighbors. This value is calculated and assigned randomly
for each node before the search begins. The requirement is either brc or dre (where r is
the global requirement for the entire network), the probability for the latter is exactly the
fractional part of r (that is, r − brc). Note, that r(i) can be zero if r < 1, and it is also
possible that r > d(i) + 1 (where d(i) is the degree of node i), in which case all nodes in
the closed neighborhood are required to be in the dominating set.
Second, we define score(i) as the current number of dominators of node i at any given
step. Initially, score(i) = 0 for every node, and it increases by one in the closed neighbor-
hood of the selected node.
Finally, we track the dominating potential(i) of node i, which counts how many nodes
in the closed neighborhood of i have not yet reached their domination requirement. Specif-
ically, potential(i) =
∑
j∈N+(i) I[score(j) < r(j)], where N
+(i) is the closed neighborhood
of i and I[x] is an indicator function that returns 1 if x is true and 0 else. In other words, the
potential is the number of nodes in the closed neighborhood that can be advanced toward
their goal by selecting i as the next dominator. The greedy search is based on this quantity:
at every step we select a node with maximum potential (with random tie-breaking among
the candidates).
The key to implementing the algorithm with optimal time complexity is the use of an
efficient data structure for maintaining a list of nodes sorted by their potentials. Note that
the potential is an integer value between 0 and N + 1, therefore we can use bucket-sort for
initial sorting. We assign one bucket for each possible potential value, and we implement
each bucket by a hashed set. This way we can add or remove a node from any bucket in
O(1) step, therefore we can perform the initial sorting in O(N) and maintain sortedness
in O(1) step after any single change in a node’s potential.
The time complexity of the algorithm can be found by analyzing the changes in scores
and potentials of nodes. The initial calculation of potentials requires a loop over all nodes’
all neighbors. Assuming we can enumerate the neighbors of node i in d(i) steps, this
calculation takes
∑
i∈V (G) 1+d(i) = 2E+N = O(E) steps. Then in the main loop one node
1E-mail: molnaf@rpi.edu
1
is selected at every step, which increases the score of the selected node and its neighbors
by one. In principle, the scores could increase until all nodes are selected (e.g., when
r > N), therefore again all nodes’ all neighbors are processed, taking O(E) steps. However,
during this procedure, there are additional steps for updating the node potentials. Some
(usually all) nodes will reach their predefined requirement at one point or another, after
which the dominating potentials change. We count these changes as follows. Initially, all
nodes can increase all their neighbors’ score toward their requirement (including the nodes
themselves), therefore the initial sum of potentials is
∑
i∈V (G) 1 +d(i) = 2E+N , or less, if
some nodes have zero requirement. The potential of a node can either be reduced by one if
a neighbor reaches its requirement (and thus that neighbor can no longer be advanced to its
goal by the current node), or it becomes zero by definition if the node is actually selected. At
most, there are 2E+N = O(E) changes (reductions) of potentials, each computed in O(1)
time (maintaining sortedness of nodes after each change), therefore during the procedure
there are at most O(E) additional steps for updating node potentials. This means the
entire algorithm runs in O(E) steps. Note that in sparse networks, O(E) = O(N).
2
Algorithm S1 Find an frDS
procedure frDS(G: graph, r: domination redundancy)
finished← 0
for all i ∈ V (G) do . initialization of score, r, and potential
score(i)← 0
potential(i)← 0
if Random(0, 1) < r − brc then
r(i)← dre
else
r(i)← brc
end if
if score(i) ≥ r(i) then
finished← finished+ 1
end if
end for
for all i ∈ V (G) do . initial calculation of potentials
for all j : (i, j) ∈ E(G) do
if score(j) < r(j) then
potential(i)← potential(i) + 1
end if
end for
if score(i) < goal(i) then
potential(i)← potential(i) + 1
end if
end for
while finished < |V (G)| ∧max(potential) > 0 do . main loop
k := random node with maximum potential . greedy step
Add k to Dominating Set . construct the output
score(k)← score(k) + 1 . count self-domination
potential(k)← 0 . remove k from further consideration
change← score(k) = r(k) . requirement of k reached in this iteration?
if change then
finished← finished+ 1
end if
for all j : (j, k) ∈ E(G) do . update neighbors of k
if change then . neighbors cannot increase score(k) any more
potential(j)← max(0, potential(j)− 1)
end if
score(j)← score(j) + 1 . k adds domination score to all its neighbors
if score(j) = r(j) then . requirement reached for the neighbor?
finished← finished+ 1
potential(j)← max(0, potential(j)− 1)
for all x : (x, j) ∈ E(G) do . update potentials of second neighbors
if x 6= k then . skip when second neighbor is k
potential(x)← max(0, potential(x)− 1)
end if
end for
end if
end for
end while
end procedure
3
Supplementary Note 2
Algorithm for Finding a Flexible-Cost Dominating Set (fcDS)
The fcDS algorithm is also a form of greedy search, since it builds the dominating set by
selecting one node at a time with maximum potential, similarly to the frDS algorithm.
However, in this method the potential is calculated from the changes in probability of
losing all dominators for the nodes in the neighborhood of the given node.
First, we define strength(i) for each node i as an input (0 < strength(i) < 1), which
defines the probability of not losing node i after the anticipated damage:
strength(i) := Pr(i is not lost). (S1)
We also keep a record of instability(i) for each node i, which is defined as the probability
of losing all dominators after the damage has occured:
instability(i) =
∏
j∈DS∩N+(i)
1− strength(j). (S2)
Initially, instability(i) = 1.0 for all i. The potential(i) of node i, which is used in the
greedy node selection, is calculated as the sum of the changes in instabilities over the
closed neighborhood of node i, if i was selected:
potential(i) = −
∑
j∈N+(i)
instability(j) Pr(i is lost)− instability(j)
= −
∑
j∈N+(i)
instability(j) [Pr(i is lost)− 1]
=
∑
j∈N+(i)
instability(j)strength(i).
(S3)
Note, that the negative sign is manually inserted to make the potential a positive value,
for practical reasons. Without it, the change in instabilities would be negative, because by
each node selection the stability always increases.
With the definition above, we select a node with maximum potential at each greedy
step. After the node has been selected and added to the dominating set, the instabilities
in the closed neighborhood, and the potentials for all nodes in the second neighborhood
of the selected node must be recalculated, and the nodes must be sorted again based on
the new potentials. Since the potentials are non-integer values (and cannot be mapped to
integers) we can only use comparative sorting, where it takes O(logN) steps to find the
new place for each node in the list. With a simple approximation for sparse networks, a
node in a network with average degree d will have O(d2) nodes in its second neighborhood,
therefore the selection of each dominator involves O(d2 logN) steps.
4
Algorithm S2 Find an fcDS
procedure fcDS(G: graph, strength: array, c: number of nodes to select)
for all i ∈ V (G) do . initialization of instability and potential
instability(i)← 1.0
potential(i)← (degree(i) + 1)(1− strength(i))
end for
for a← 1 ... c do . a simply counts the output
k ← random node with maximum potential . greedy selection
Add k to Dominating Set . construct the output
S ← ∅ . set of nodes whose potential must be updated
instability(k)← instability(k)(1− strength(k)) . update self instability
for all j : (k, j) ∈ E(G) do
instability(j)← instability(j)(1− strength(k) . update instability of
neighbors
S ← S ∪ {j} . request potential update for j
for all i : (j, i) ∈ E(G) do
S ← S ∪ {i} . request potential update for second neighbors
end for
end for
for all i ∈ S do . update potentials
potential(i)← 0
if i /∈ Dominating Set then
for all j : (i, j) ∈ E(G) do
potential(i)← potential(i) + instability(j)strength(i)
end for
potential(i)← potential(i) + instability(i)strength(i)
end if
end for
end for
end procedure
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Supplementary Note 3
Measuring and Controlling Assortativity
Assortativity of a network, defined loosely, is the tendency that nodes of similar degrees
are connected to each other. We measure assortativity of a network using Spearman’s ρ
[1], which has been shown recently [2] to be a much more accurate measure of assortativity
than Newman’s assortativity coefficient [3, 4]. Spearman’s ρ values have a range of (−1, 1),
ranging from completely disassortative to completely assortative. Note, that a network
with ρ = 0 is called an uncorrelated network.
In our recent work [5] we have proposed a method to control the assortativity of a
network using a Markov-chain of double-edge swaps [6], guided by biased edge-swap ac-
ceptance probabilities. These swaps preserve the degree sequence of a network, but change
its assortativity. We provide here an overview of this method again for the reader’s conve-
nience.
In our method, we look for randomly (uniformly) selected pairs of edges that have four
distinct nodes and no common incident edges. These edge pairs allow for a double-edge
swap. However, instead of accepting all swaps, we only accept them with the following
probability:
Pr(accept) =

p if p > 0 and the swap makes the network more assortative
−p if p < 0 and the swap makes the network more dissortative
1− |p| else,
(S4)
where −1 < p < 1 is a parameter that controls the acceptance ratio of assortative and
dissortative swaps. A swap is classified as assortative or dissortative if it increases or
decreases the assortativity coefficient [3, 4] of the network, which can be evaluated very
quickly.
Using our guided edge-mixing, we can reach a wide range of ρ values for any given
network; however, determining the correct p value for a desired ρ is nontrivial. Due to the
random nature of the mixing procedure, the resulting value of ρ is a random variable. The
mean of ρ monotonically increases as p increases, allowing us to use a randomized bisection
search to find the needed p for a desired ρ.
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Supplementary Figure S1: Stability of dominating sets vs. power-law degree exponent γ
and Spearman’s ρ assortativity measure. (a) and (c) present random node removal, (b) and
(d) show degree-ranked node removal. The insets illustrate the sizes of the corresponding
dominating sets. In (a) and (b): ρ = 0.0; in (c) and (d): γ = 2.5. Common parameters:
N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, f = 0.3. Results are averaged over 200 network samples.
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Supplementary Figure S2: Comparison of size and stability of dominating sets vs.
power-law degree exponent, at various fractions of random node removal. Synthetic net-
works, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, ρ = 0.0. Results are averaged over 200 network samples.
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Supplementary Figure S3: Comparison of size and stability of dominating sets vs.
power-law degree exponent at various fractions of degree ranked node removal. Synthetic
networks, N = 5000, 〈k〉 = 8, ρ = 0.0. Results are averaged over 200 network samples.
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Supplementary Figure S4: Comparison of size and stability dominating sets vs. as-
sortativity at various fractions of random node removal. Synthetic networks, N = 5000,
〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5. Results are averaged over 200 network samples.
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Supplementary Figure S5: Comparison of size and stability dominating sets vs. assor-
tativity at various fractions of degree-ranked node removal. Synthetic networks, N = 5000,
〈k〉 = 8, γ = 2.5. Results are averaged over 200 network samples.
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Supplementary Figure S6: Size of frDS as a function of domination redundancy, at
various power-law degree exponents and Spearman’s ρ values, in synthetic networks with
N = 5000. The sizes of MDS, CDS, and DDS are shown for comparison.
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Supplementary Figure S7: Stability of frDS and fcDS against random damage, as a
function of dominating set size (cost), at various power-law degree exponents and Spear-
man’s ρ values, in synthetic networks with N = 5000. The stabilities of MDS, CDS, and
DDS are shown for comparison at their corresponding set sizes. Black legend symbols refer
to the shape only, colors refer to damage fractions.
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Supplementary Figure S8: Stability of frDS and fcDS against targeted attack, as a
function of dominating set size (cost), at various power-law degree exponents and Spear-
man’s ρ values, in synthetic networks with N = 5000. The stabilities of MDS, CDS, and
DDS are shown for comparison at their corresponding set sizes. Black legend symbols refer
to the shape only, colors refer to damage fractions.
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Supplementary Figure S9: Stability of partial frDS against random damage, as a func-
tion of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.1.
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Supplementary Figure S10: Stability of partial frDS against random damage, as a
function of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.3.
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Supplementary Figure S11: Stability of partial frDS against random damage, as a
function of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.5.
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Supplementary Figure S12: Stability of partial frDS against targeted attack, as a
function of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.1.
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Supplementary Figure S13: Stability of partial frDS against targeted attack, as a
function of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.3.
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Supplementary Figure S14: Stability of partial frDS against targeted attack, as a
function of redundancy level and dominating set size, at various power-law degree exponents
and Spearman’s ρ values. Synthetic networks, N = 5000, damage fraction f = 0.5.
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Supplementary Figure S15: Degree distribution of Gnutella08 network [7] on linear
scale.
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Supplementary Figure S16: Degree distribution of Gnutella08 network [7] on double-
logarithmic scale.
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Supplementary Figure S17: Degree distribution of Gnutella08 network [7] on log-linear
scale.
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Supplementary Figure S18: Degree distribution of ENTSO-E powergrid [8, 9] on linear
scale.
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Supplementary Figure S19: Degree distribution of ENTSO-E powergrid [8, 9] on
double-logarithmic scale.
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Supplementary Figure S20: Degree distribution of ENTSO-E powergrid [8, 9] on log-
linear scale.
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Supplementary Figure S21: Average degree in brain graphs. See Supplementary Ta-
ble S2 for sample numbers.
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Supplementary Figure S22: Assortativity of brain graphs. See Supplementary Table S2
for sample numbers.
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Supplementary Figure S23: Degree distributions of 12 randomly picked brain graphs
on linear scale.
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Supplementary Figure S24: Degree distributions of 12 randomly picked brain graphs
on double-logarithmic scale.
26
0 5000 10000 15000
10-10
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P(
k)
k
Supplementary Figure S25: Degree distributions of 12 randomly picked brain graphs
on log-linear scale.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 MDS
 CDS
 DDS|D
S| 
/ N
Sample number
Supplementary Figure S26: Comparison of dominating set sizes in brain graphs. See
Supplementary Table S2 for sample numbers.
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sample# graph sample# graph
1 KKI-21 KKI2009-01 big graph w inv 51 MRN114 M87114047 big graph w inv
2 KKI-21 KKI2009-02 big graph w inv 52 MRN114 M87114064 big graph w inv
3 KKI-21 KKI2009-03 big graph w inv 53 MRN114 M87115498 big graph w inv
4 KKI-21 KKI2009-04 big graph w inv 54 MRN114 M87115517 big graph w inv
5 KKI-21 KKI2009-05 big graph w inv 55 MRN114 M87117119 big graph w inv
6 KKI-21 KKI2009-06 big graph w inv 56 MRN114 M87117167 big graph w inv
7 KKI-21 KKI2009-07 big graph w inv 57 MRN114 M87120962 big graph w inv
8 KKI-21 KKI2009-08 big graph w inv 58 MRN114 M87121943 big graph w inv
9 KKI-21 KKI2009-09 big graph w inv 59 MRN114 M87121956 big graph w inv
10 KKI-21 KKI2009-10 big graph w inv 60 MRN114 M87122092 big graph w inv
11 KKI-21 KKI2009-11 big graph w inv 61 MRN114 M87123042 big graph w inv
12 KKI-21 KKI2009-12 big graph w inv 62 MRN114 M87123449 big graph w inv
13 KKI-21 KKI2009-13 big graph w inv 63 MRN114 M87123913 big graph w inv
14 KKI-21 KKI2009-14 big graph w inv 64 MRN114 M87124633 big graph w inv
15 KKI-21 KKI2009-15 big graph w inv 65 MRN114 M87124781 big graph w inv
16 KKI-21 KKI2009-16 big graph w inv 66 MRN114 M87124827 big graph w inv
17 KKI-21 KKI2009-17 big graph w inv 67 MRN114 M87125134 big graph w inv
18 KKI-21 KKI2009-18 big graph w inv 68 MRN114 M87128444 big graph w inv
19 KKI-21 KKI2009-19 big graph w inv 69 MRN114 M87129719 big graph w inv
20 KKI-21 KKI2009-20 big graph w inv 70 MRN114 M87129789 big graph w inv
21 KKI-21 KKI2009-21 big graph w inv 71 MRN114 M87131806 big graph w inv
22 KKI-21 KKI2009-22 big graph w inv 72 MRN114 M87134068 big graph w inv
23 KKI-21 KKI2009-23 big graph w inv 73 MRN114 M87135647 big graph w inv
24 KKI-21 KKI2009-24 big graph w inv 74 MRN114 M87136332 big graph w inv
25 KKI-21 KKI2009-25 big graph w inv 75 MRN114 M87136832 big graph w inv
26 KKI-21 KKI2009-26 big graph w inv 76 MRN114 M87139021 big graph w inv
27 KKI-21 KKI2009-27 big graph w inv 77 MRN114 M87139257 big graph w inv
28 KKI-21 KKI2009-28 big graph w inv 78 MRN114 M87141220 big graph w inv
29 KKI-21 KKI2009-29 big graph w inv 79 MRN114 M87141664 big graph w inv
30 KKI-21 KKI2009-30 big graph w inv 80 MRN114 M87141793 big graph w inv
31 KKI-21 KKI2009-31 big graph w inv 81 MRN114 M87141858 big graph w inv
32 KKI-21 KKI2009-32 big graph w inv 82 MRN114 M87141906 big graph w inv
33 KKI-21 KKI2009-33 big graph w inv 83 MRN114 M87141949 big graph w inv
34 KKI-21 KKI2009-34 big graph w inv 84 MRN114 M87142764 big graph w inv
35 KKI-21 KKI2009-35 big graph w inv 85 MRN114 M87143273 big graph w inv
36 KKI-21 KKI2009-36 big graph w inv 86 MRN114 M87144889 big graph w inv
37 KKI-21 KKI2009-37 big graph w inv 87 MRN114 M87144896 big graph w inv
38 KKI-21 KKI2009-38 big graph w inv 88 MRN114 M87145479 big graph w inv
39 KKI-21 KKI2009-39 big graph w inv 89 MRN114 M87145575 big graph w inv
40 KKI-21 KKI2009-40 big graph w inv 90 MRN114 M87146520 big graph w inv
41 KKI-21 KKI2009-41 big graph w inv 91 MRN114 M87146993 big graph w inv
42 KKI-21 KKI2009-42 big graph w inv 92 MRN114 M87147006 big graph w inv
43 MRN114 M87102217 big graph w inv 93 MRN114 M87148745 big graph w inv
44 MRN114 M87102806 big graph w inv 94 MRN114 M87149014 big graph w inv
45 MRN114 M87103074 big graph w inv 95 MRN114 M87149025 big graph w inv
46 MRN114 M87105476 big graph w inv 96 MRN114 M87150194 big graph w inv
47 MRN114 M87107085 big graph w inv 97 MRN114 M87150415 big graph w inv
48 MRN114 M87108094 big graph w inv 98 MRN114 M87150639 big graph w inv
49 MRN114 M87111487 big graph w inv 99 MRN114 M87151117 big graph w inv
50 MRN114 M87111924 big graph w inv 100 MRN114 M87151146 big graph w inv
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sample# graph sample# graph
101 MRN114 M87151453 big graph w inv 151 MRN114 M87192995 big graph w inv
102 MRN114 M87152844 big graph w inv 152 MRN114 M87193409 big graph w inv
103 MRN114 M87153569 big graph w inv 153 MRN114 M87196363 big graph w inv
104 MRN114 M87154559 big graph w inv 154 MRN114 M87196591 big graph w inv
105 MRN114 M87155496 big graph w inv 155 MRN114 M87199297 big graph w inv
106 MRN114 M87155949 big graph w inv 156 MRN114 M87199728 big graph w inv
107 MRN114 M87156106 big graph w inv 157 NKI-TRT 0021001 1 big graph w inv
108 MRN114 M87157827 big graph w inv 158 NKI-TRT 0021001 2 big graph w inv
109 MRN114 M87158338 big graph w inv 159 NKI-TRT 0021002 1 big graph w inv
110 MRN114 M87158534 big graph w inv 160 NKI-TRT 0021002 2 big graph w inv
111 MRN114 M87159410 big graph w inv 161 NKI-TRT 0021006 1 big graph w inv
112 MRN114 M87159580 big graph w inv 162 NKI-TRT 0021006 2 big graph w inv
113 MRN114 M87160332 big graph w inv 163 NKI-TRT 0021018 1 big graph w inv
114 MRN114 M87160375 big graph w inv 164 NKI-TRT 0021018 2 big graph w inv
115 MRN114 M87161235 big graph w inv 165 NKI-TRT 0021024 1 big graph w inv
116 MRN114 M87161902 big graph w inv 166 NKI-TRT 0021024 2 big graph w inv
117 MRN114 M87162915 big graph w inv 167 NKI-TRT 1427581 2 big graph w inv
118 MRN114 M87164412 big graph w inv 168 NKI-TRT 1793622 1 big graph w inv
119 MRN114 M87164886 big graph w inv 169 NKI-TRT 1793622 2 big graph w inv
120 MRN114 M87165017 big graph w inv 170 NKI-TRT 1961098 1 big graph w inv
121 MRN114 M87165441 big graph w inv 171 NKI-TRT 1961098 2 big graph w inv
122 MRN114 M87166115 big graph w inv 172 NKI-TRT 2475376 1 big graph w inv
123 MRN114 M87168759 big graph w inv 173 NKI-TRT 2475376 2 big graph w inv
124 MRN114 M87174803 big graph w inv 174 NKI-TRT 2799329 1 big graph w inv
125 MRN114 M87176019 big graph w inv 175 NKI-TRT 2799329 2 big graph w inv
126 MRN114 M87176708 big graph w inv 176 NKI-TRT 2842950 1 big graph w inv
127 MRN114 M87178630 big graph w inv 177 NKI-TRT 2842950 2 big graph w inv
128 MRN114 M87179511 big graph w inv 178 NKI-TRT 3201815 1 big graph w inv
129 MRN114 M87179597 big graph w inv 179 NKI-TRT 3201815 2 big graph w inv
130 MRN114 M87179713 big graph w inv 180 NKI-TRT 3313349 1 big graph w inv
131 MRN114 M87181205 big graph w inv 181 NKI-TRT 3313349 2 big graph w inv
132 MRN114 M87181216 big graph w inv 182 NKI-TRT 3315657 1 big graph w inv
133 MRN114 M87182922 big graph w inv 183 NKI-TRT 3315657 2 big graph w inv
134 MRN114 M87183189 big graph w inv 184 NKI-TRT 3795193 1 big graph w inv
135 MRN114 M87183485 big graph w inv 185 NKI-TRT 3795193 2 big graph w inv
136 MRN114 M87184910 big graph w inv 186 NKI-TRT 3808535 1 big graph w inv
137 MRN114 M87185000 big graph w inv 187 NKI-TRT 3808535 2 big graph w inv
138 MRN114 M87186642 big graph w inv 188 NKI-TRT 3893245 2 big graph w inv
139 MRN114 M87187090 big graph w inv 189 NKI-TRT 4176156 1 big graph w inv
140 MRN114 M87187750 big graph w inv 190 NKI-TRT 4176156 2 big graph w inv
141 MRN114 M87187984 big graph w inv 191 NKI-TRT 4288245 1 big graph w inv
142 MRN114 M87188000 big graph w inv 192 NKI-TRT 4288245 2 big graph w inv
143 MRN114 M87188762 big graph w inv 193 NKI-TRT 6471972 1 big graph w inv
144 MRN114 M87190609 big graph w inv 194 NKI-TRT 7055197 1 big graph w inv
145 MRN114 M87190745 big graph w inv 195 NKI-TRT 7055197 2 big graph w inv
146 MRN114 M87191087 big graph w inv 196 NKI-TRT 8574662 1 big graph w inv
147 MRN114 M87191258 big graph w inv 197 NKI-TRT 8735778 1 big graph w inv
148 MRN114 M87192333 big graph w inv 198 NKI-TRT 8735778 2 big graph w inv
149 MRN114 M87192557 big graph w inv 199 NKI-TRT 9630905 1 big graph w inv
150 MRN114 M87192637 big graph w inv 200 NKI-TRT 9630905 2 big graph w inv
Supplementary Table S2: Sample numbers of brain graphs that we use to identify them
in our figures. Graph data is available with identical file names at [10].
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Supplementary Figure S27: Dominating set sizes vs. assortativity in Gnutella08
graph [7], achieved by random (biased) mixing of exges by double-edge swaps. The vertical
dashed line indicates the assortativity of the original graph.
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Supplementary Figure S28: Dominating set sizes vs. assortativity in powergrid graph
[8, 9], achieved by random (biased) mixing of exges by double-edge swaps. The vertical
dashed line indicates the assortativity of the original graph.
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Supplementary Figure S29: Dominating set sizes vs. assortativity in brain graph KKI-
21 KKI2009-19 [10, 11], achieved by random (biased) mixing of edges by double-edge
swaps. The vertical dashed line indicates the assortativity of the original graph. Note that
frDS curves with r = 2 and r = 3 overlap.
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